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Fisheries management involves balancing the competing demands of different users of ﬁshery resources.
Conﬂicts among ﬁsheries stakeholders arise due to differences in power, interests, values, priorities, and
manner of resource exploitation. Conﬂicts also emanate from institutional failures in managing ﬁsheries
and enforcing laws and regulations. Effective targeted communication has a key role to play in managing
conﬂicts between ﬁsheries stakeholders. This paper assesses a ﬁsheries conﬂict communication frame-
work called FishCom, a tool for developing plans and strategies for managing conﬂicts in coastal ﬁsheries
in Bangladesh. FishCom is a structured participatory process intended for use by policymakers and
ﬁshery managers. The results show that effective communication plans can play a signiﬁcant role in
eliminating conﬂicts.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In Bangladesh and many other developing countries, poverty,
intense competition for ﬁshery resources and ineffective resource
management institutions increase the challenges in managing
ﬁsheries conﬂicts. Destructive ﬁshing practices and competition
between users of different classes of gear, resulting from ineffective
governance and increasing population, are imposing severe stress
on the coastal ﬁsheries of Bangladesh. These factors also contribute
to the increasing incidence of conﬂicts among ﬁshery stakeholders
(Kuperan and Jahan, 2010).
Conﬂicts take place in ﬁsheries when groups or individuals seek
the same resource using differentmethods or try to utilize the same
space for their activities with either party seeking dominance
(Bennett et al., 2001; Charles, 1992; FAO, 2003). Conﬂicts over ac-
cess and control of ﬁsheries and aquatic resources are a global
phenomenon. However, they have particular importance in devel-
oping countries where a signiﬁcant portion of the population de-
pends on capture ﬁsheries for food and livelihoods. Conﬂict can
lead to violence, but avoiding and shunning conﬂict is alsoþ880 2 8811151.
@gmail.com (K.M. Jahan),
y, kuperan@gmail.com (K.K.
Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND problematic because unresolved problemsmay ﬂare up again, often
with renewed vigor (Salayo et al., 2006).
While a conﬂict resolution model (Coser, 1967; Zartman, 1991)
assumes that each dispute needs to be conclusively resolved
because of its destructive potential, the conﬂict management
approach (Daniels andWalker, 2001) views some level of conﬂict as
inevitable. The emphasis in this approach, which we adopt, is to
manage conﬂicts in a way that can transform the dynamic towards
positive change, and reduce the chances that it will turn destructive
or violent. Conﬂict resolution refers to settling disputes with the
approval of all parties, whereas conﬂict management refers to the
long-term process of addressing conﬂicts constructively, some of
whichmay never have a ﬁnal resolution (Borg,1992; Charles, 1992).
Conﬂict management may, in fact, offer better opportunities for
achieving a more lasting and meaningful peace.
Institutions are widely viewed as evolving in response to in-
centives to take collective action so as to minimize conﬂicts and
transaction costs. However, the presence of institutions does not
guarantee conﬂict prevention. Institutional weakness is pervasive
in ﬁsheries and the coastal management sectors of most developing
countries (Torell and Salamanca, 2002). In particular, legal and
institutional frameworks which promote and protect access rights
for small-scale ﬁshers are often either weak or poorly implemented
(Delgado et al., 2003). Furthermore, the economic view of in-
stitutions and conﬂicts often fails to pay sufﬁcient attention to the
uneven distribution of power in society, since institutions and rules
emerge through bargaining and strategic conﬂict, where thelicense.
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(Knight, 1992).
Consequently, existing institutions are unlikely to favor or fairly
represent the interests of poor resource users when they differ
from those of more powerful users. Thus, the need for institutional
representation in management decisions, including those about
conﬂicts, may represent an important motivator for ﬁshers to
become involved in conﬂict management processes (Nielsen et al.,
2004; Pomeroy et al., 2001, 2007). However, in practice, small-scale
ﬁshers’ low levels of social capital often mean that they are
excluded from opportunities to participate in formal conﬂict
management processes, where such options exist. This implies a
need for more participatory and inclusive conﬂict management
processes such as those described in this paper.
Although there is no single formula for dealing with conﬂict, a
consistent conclusion in studies of ﬁsheries conﬂicts is the need for
interactive conﬂict management strategies and improving
communication between the different layers of ﬁsheries manage-
ment (Garforth, 2005; Kuperan et al., 2003; Best, 2003; Mason
et al., 2002; Bennett et al., 2001). Communication among stake-
holders, either between actors directly involved in conﬂicts or
those who may play a role in negotiations, is integral to the process
of framing problems (Coser, 1956). Communication is also vital for
ensuring participation in the implementation of management de-
cisions relating to natural resources and in settling any consequent
disputes that may arise among stakeholders (Dugan, 1996). The
guiding principle is to frame strategic communication in a way that
orients stakeholders towardsmanaging conﬂicts constructively and
equitably (Moore, 1996).
In the present study, communication planning for conﬂict
management is addressed as a tool for resolving conﬂicts or
establishing consensus-building processes in coastal ﬁsheries. This
communication framework can be used by ﬁsheries managers in
collaboration with ﬁshery stakeholders to identify conﬂicts, to
pinpoint their root causes and constraints to their solution, and to
develop suitable strategies for improving communication between
stakeholders with the capacity to inﬂuence policy and resolve or
reduce conﬂicts. The overall objective of this study is to describe the
use of this framework for resolving conﬂicts in the coastal ﬁsheries
of Bangladesh, and to evaluate its effectiveness.Fig. 1. Fisheries Conﬂicts Communication Framework (FishCom): A tool for developing
plans and strategies for managing ﬁsheries conﬂicts.
Adapted from WorldFish, 2005.2. Coastal ﬁsheries of Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a subtropical country situated at the apex of the
Bay of Bengal, with 710 km of coastline. The ﬁsheries sector pro-
vides livelihoods to millions of rural poor and contributes signiﬁ-
cantly to national food and nutrition security. About 511 marine
species, including shrimps, are present in Bangladesh’s waters
(Mazid, 2002). The country produced 3.06 million tons of ﬁsh in
2010e11, of which 0.55 million tons (18%) came from marine cap-
ture ﬁsheries (DOF, 2012). About 92% of total marine catch comes
from traditional gears such as gill net/driftnets, estuarine and ma-
rine set bag nets, trammel nets, bottom long lines and beach seines,
and the remaining 8% comes from large-scale trawl ﬁsheries (DOF,
2012).
A recent report on coastal ﬁsheries in Bangladesh shows that
catch per unit ﬁshing effort is falling, and several species of marine
shrimp and ﬁsh stocks are in decline (Hussain and Hoq, 2010). Non-
compliance with ﬁshing rules and regulations and the attempts of
coastal ﬁshers to support their livelihoods by any means possible,
result in increasing ﬁshing pressure, use of destructive ﬁshing
methods and gears, and a tendency to ﬁsh whatever is available,
including larvae and juveniles. This not only causes serious damage
to coastal ﬁshery resources but also creates conﬂict between ﬁshersand other resource users (Hussian and Hoq, 2010; ICZMP and
WARPO, 2004; Rouf and Jensen, 2001).
Marine ﬁsheries management and enforcement of rules and
regulations is centrally regulated by the Marine Fisheries Ordi-
nance, 1983. The Department of Fisheries (DOF) is responsible for
the management, conservation, supervision and development of
marine ﬁsheries and issuing licenses for all marine ﬁshing in the
Bangladesh territorial waters. At least twelve other government
departments are also directly or indirectly involved in providing
support for marine ﬁsheries development. However, due to di-
versity of interest and lack of coordination, there is a considerable
degree of rivalry and conﬂict between different ministries which
has been identiﬁed as a major constraint in planning marine ﬁsh-
eries management and development (BOBP, 1997; ICZMP and
WARPO, 2004).
3. Materials and methods
As an exercise in action research, this study aimed to use the
communication framework outlined above for understanding
conﬂicts in the coastal ﬁsheries of Bangladesh and to identify
practical strategies for managing them. The framework was
developed through a series of participatory discussions between
stakeholders including government and NGO workers engaged in
ﬁshery management, and small-scale ﬁshers. The next sub-sections
describe the framework and corresponding tools.
3.1. The “Fisheries Conﬂicts Communication Framework” (FishCom)
FishCom is an approach for developing plans and strategies for
managing ﬁsheries conﬂicts which has previously been successfully
applied to inland ﬁsheries in Bangladesh (Jahan et al., 2009).
FishCom is composed of a set of chronologically organized steps
and tools for gathering, collating and evaluating information to
guide participatory management of ﬁshery conﬂicts (Fig. 1). The
four major steps and corresponding tools are discussed below.
3.1.1. Information gathering
Information gathering is a crucial initial step. This enables un-
derstanding of the key issues related to a conﬂict and its causes, the
values held and circumstances faced by its stakeholders, and their
interrelationships. The information gathering tools used in the
study include: a socioeconomic survey, an attitudinal Participatory
Fig. 2. Map of Bangladesh with study location.
(Source: Authors own drawing using Centre for Environmental and Geographic In-
formation Services (CEGIS) data). The Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh established the CEGIS as a scientiﬁcally independent center of excellence is
to support the management of natural resources for sustainable socio-economic
development using integrated environmental analysis, geographic information sys-
tems, remote sensing, and information technology.
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group discussions. PISCES followed a ﬁeld manual developed by
Bennett and Jolley (2002), and employs a variety of participatory
tools. These include: a Participatory Geographic Information Exer-
cise (PGIE) to identify the location of conﬂicts; a time line exercise
to evaluate conﬂicts from an historical perspective; institutional
wheel analysis to identify communication partners who may help
to resolve conﬂicts; and semi-structured interviews with
stakeholders.
3.1.2. Communication planning & strategy
This step was designed to organize communication about con-
ﬂicts to and between stakeholders. Tools include an Actor-linkage
Matrix (ALM) and Communication Planning Matrix (CPM). The
ALM is used to map interaction and ﬂows of information between
key actors (Biggs and Matsaert, 2004). Relevant actors in the study
include ﬁshery resource users, district and upazilla (sub-district)
administrators, the media, NGOs working with ﬁsher communities
and policymakers. These actors were identiﬁed using the partici-
patory approaches applied in the information gathering steps
described above. In the ALM, the actors are listed along the top and
down the side of a square matrix. The cells are used to record a
description of the state of communication relations between each
pair of actors and constraints that distort communication.
Communication Planning Matrix (CPM) is a tool used for
developing a communication strategy. The CPM identiﬁes
communication partners with whom a particular organization or
project wants to communicate, and in each case deﬁnes, the ob-
jectives of communicating in resolving conﬂicts. It also speciﬁes the
content of the communication in order to reach the objectives and
indicates the channels through which the communication with
each partner could be conducted most effectively. The Communi-
cation Planning Matrix and Strategies (CPM-CS) is an expanded
form of the CPM which includes the time-frame, implementers of
interventions, and monetary and non-monetary costs of each op-
tion in conﬂict resolution. These details are necessary for the pri-
oritization and selection of interventions to achieve objectives
within a realistic time and budget schedule.
3.1.3. Implementation of communication interventions
In this step, actionable communication interventions were
evaluated and pre-implementation activities were organized. Costs
and logistical arrangements were considered and a variety of ac-
tivities were implemented accordingly. These included meetings,
workshops, dialogues, exchange visits, training on consensus
building, distribution of leaﬂets and posters, and ﬁeld rallies.
3.1.4. Impact measurement of communication interventions
This step measured changes in the livelihood outcomes of
community members resulting from communication interventions.
However, changes in livelihoods and socio-economic status are a
long-term result of consensus building efforts. Due to the short
time span of the project, this evaluation was conducted by
comparing responses to an attitude statements survey carried out
at the beginning and end of the survey. The attitude survey used
structured attitude statements designed to obtain qualiﬁed and
quantiﬁed perceptions of the conditions, norms, morals, values and
priorities of ﬁshers and conﬂict managers in relation to ﬁsheries
conﬂicts.
3.2. Study area and data
This action research work was jointly implemented by World-
Fish Bangladesh and FAO’s Empowerment of Coastal Fishing Com-
munities for Livelihood Security (ECFC) project, in Cox’s Bazardistrict. The ECFC project was undertaken by the Government’s
Department of Fisheries (DOF) with technical and ﬁnancial support
of FAO/UNDP for a period of six years from December 2000. The
overall goal of ECFC was to initiate a process of change that
enhanced targeted coastal communities’ capacity by increasing
their stock of livelihoods assets and reducing vulnerability to
insecurity.
ECFC formed four tiers of institutions at different administrative
levels within the district. Separate Village Organizations (VO) were
formed for men and women at village level, aimed at the social
mobilization and empowerment of ﬁshing communities. Village
Development Committees (VDC) were established to facilitate co-
ordination of activities undertaken bymen’s and women’s VOs. The
project also formed sub-district level ﬁshers’ networks (Upazilla
Fishers Federations e UFF), and district level networks (District
Fishers Federations e DFF).
These local institutions were formed to organize poor and
marginal ﬁshers and empower them to analyze their own situation,
and develop and implement action plans to improve their indi-
vidual and collective welfare. Fisheries Management Advisory
Committees (FMAC) for the sustainable conservation of ﬁsheries
resources, comprised of a range of stakeholders’ responsible for
costal resource management, were also formed at upazilla and
district level.
Fieldwork was organized in eighteen coastal ﬁshing villages of
Cox’s Bazar, including two islands (Sonadia and St. Martin’s), from
October 2004, and completed in September 2006. Following Fish-
Com, activities leading to the formulation of the communication
strategy for conﬂict resolution started with gathering baseline in-
formation. The PISCES tool was applied in 10 different locations,
covering all eighteen villages, to identify costal ﬁsheries conﬂicts
(Fig. 2). The exercise was conducted from late January 2005 to mid-
February 2005. A series of workshops, meetings, and group
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March 2005 to June 2005 to develop the communication planning
matrix and strategy for conﬂict resolution.
Selected communication interventions were conducted in each
study site from July 2005eJune 2006 with the active participation
of stakeholders. Activities included providing consensus building
training and organizing workshops, meetings and dialogues among
ﬁshery stakeholders. During the study period ECFC also organized a
number of awareness raising communication events such as ﬁeld
rallies, miking,3 folk dramas, circulation of posters and leaﬂets, and
mass media campaigns against illegal ﬁshing practices. A number
of exchange visits between Bangladesh and Indian ﬁshery stake-
holders were also organized to help develop a common under-
standing of ﬁshery problems.
An attitude survey involving 167 ﬁshery stakeholders and 53
conﬂict managers was implemented to measure the impact of
communication interventions. Conﬂict managers included com-
munity leaders such as CBO leaders, village heads, local govern-
ment body members, boat owners and ﬁsh traders’ association
leaders, respected persons of the locality, ﬁshery ofﬁcers, NGO and
project staff, politicians and media personnel. An ex-ante attitude
surveywas conducted in JanuaryeFebruary 2004 using face-to-face
meetings and group discussions. The same set of questions was
used from July 2006eAugust 2006 to assess changes in attitude as a
result of communication interventions. A combination of general
and site-speciﬁc attitude statements was compiled to cover subject
matter including; understandings of conﬂicts, manageability of
conﬂicts, prerequisites for conﬂict resolution, resolution processes,
and responsibility in conﬂict resolution. Attitude statements were
evaluated using the ﬁve-point Likert scale method, the range of
which (‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘undecided’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly
disagree’) were adopted after discussion with the communities.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Conﬂicts in coastal ﬁsheries
The diversity of resources and livelihood opportunities in
coastal areas attracts various extractive interests (Marschke, 2012).
Conﬂict scenarios have increasingly arisen as stagnating ﬁshery
harvests have coincided with pressures from population growth
and a growing range of resource users from outside the area. Over
time, competition between traditional and new entrants to the
ﬁsheries, along with institutional weakness have become major
causes of conﬂict. The application of PISCES (used for information
gathering under FishCom) identiﬁed several types of conﬂict in the
study sites which are outlined brieﬂy below:
4.1.1. Who controls the ﬁshery?
Conﬂicts of this type relate to who determines the access, rights
or entitlements of ﬁshers to ﬁsh in a disputed area. Access issues are
the root cause of this type of conﬂict. One such conﬂict was re-
ported by ﬁshers from Natmura village near the River Naf of Teknaf
Upazilla who reported that they had been forced to stop ﬁshing in
parts of the river surrounding a neighboring village after ﬁshers
there began to enforce a longstanding claim that the area
‘belonged’ to their village. The dispute occurred due to the assertion
of pseudo-property rights based on residency and ancestral occu-
pation, over an area of water which was formally designated as
open access. This type of conﬂict may also occur due to rivalry over
access to ﬁshing grounds between small-scale traditional ﬁshers3 Public broadcast using vans that travel from village to village broadcasting
messages is known locally as miking.and powerful local individuals, a situation found to be common in
all the study sites. As a result of these dynamics, operators of ﬁxed
gear such as estuarine set bag nets (ESBN) and marine set bag nets
(MSBN) reported having to move from locations where they had
ﬁshed for generations to less productive areas after locally powerful
individuals took control over the ﬁshing grounds by use of verbal
threats or, frequently, physical violence, and sometimes allowed
them to ﬁsh only after receiving monetary payment, which is
totally illegal.
Conﬂict over access rights also occurs when the ﬁshers of
bordering nations (Myanmar and India) enter Bangladesh’s terri-
torial waters or vice-versa, and become involved in conﬂict with
local ﬁshers. This type of transboundary conﬂict comes to the fore
when the border security force of the neighboring nation seizes
boats and nets and arrests ﬁshers, claiming that they entered ter-
ritorial waters illegally. These incidents are made more frequent
because of unresolved issues of boundary demarcation at sea.
Fishers face substantial losses when they are arrested. One ﬁsher
interviewed in Teknaf upazilla was caught by the Myanmar border
security force with other fellow ﬁshers in 2003 and reported that
they were sent to jail after being arrested and faced severe torture
while in custody.
Bangladesh has brought the issue of sea boundary demarcation
with India and Myanmar to the UN Arbitration Tribunal. The In-
ternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea offered a verdict on this
longstanding dispute over the maritime boundary in the Bay of
Bengal between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 2012 (The Daily Star,
2012). Arbitration with India is expected to be settled in 2014. The
MyanmareBangladesh verdict gave undisputed rights to both the
countries to the ﬁsh in waters and to explore the natural resources
beneath the seabed of their respective maritime boundaries and
clearly demarcated the marine boundary between the two coun-
tries. The verdict has lessened the tension between the two coun-
tries e which nearly escalated into a conﬂict during 2008 when
both countries sent their navy to the disputed areawhereMyanmar
was drilling for exploring oil-gas e and is thus likely to have pos-
itive implications for transboundary disputes relating to the ﬁshery.
4.1.2. How is the ﬁshery controlled?
This type of conﬂict appears due to lack of implementation of
regulations by enforcment agencies. Conﬂicts of this type in the
study sites were due to indiscriminate ﬁshing practices and
resource sharing among rival groups of ﬁshers. Monoﬁlament net,
mosquito net and small mesh net used for shrimp fry collection are
banned by law for use in ﬁshing yet are frequently used by the
illegal gear operators at sea, which often creates conﬂict with other
ﬁshers. The use of trawlers encroaching in areas allocated for
traditional ﬁshers was one of the most common conﬂicts in the
study area. The disputes result from inadequate enforcement of the
Marine Fisheries Ordinance 1983, which aimed to curb the excess
capacity of industrial trawlers by creating separate ﬁshing zones e
up to 40 m water depth for traditional gear and above 40 m water
depth for trawlers.
4.1.3. Relationships between ﬁshery users
Conﬂicts of this type occur when a group of ﬁshers asserts that
their ﬁshing operations and rights are negatively affected by the
action of another group of ﬁshers or stakeholders. The study found
that disputes gravitate around competing claims on ﬁshing grounds
mostly between active gears such as Small Mesh Drift Nets (SMD),
but also occur between active and passive gears such as SMD and
Marine Set Bag Nets (MSBN). When two parties ﬁshing in the same
area accidentally drift into each other and become entangled the
nets may need to be cut, thereby also resulting in conﬂicts between
the two parties.
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owners when the latter refuse to pay ﬁshers’ according to their
earlier commitments, or are reluctant to provide safety equipment
before the ﬁshing voyage. Boat owners who were interviewed
admitted that this often causes conﬂicts with ﬁshers. However,
owners stated that ﬁshers did not always provide them with the
true ﬁgures of ﬁsh catches. They suspected some ﬁshers under their
employ illegally sold ﬁsh at sea in order to gain extra beneﬁts.
According to owners, this is the main reason for conﬂict with the
ﬁshers they employ.
Fishers and boat owners also reported conﬂicts with ﬁsh traders
due to the nature of market governance structures. Conﬂict arises
when local ﬁsh traders create a syndicate and force the ﬁshers or
boat owners to sell their catch directly to them, preventing traders
from other areas from competing. Fishers reported that they never
received the perceived ‘true’ market value from these ﬁsh traders.
Conﬂict also happened between money lenders and ﬁshers when
the latter failed to repay their loans.
4.1.4. How are ﬁshery resources used?
This type of conﬂict arises when different uses of the aquatic
environment create adverse impacts on the ﬁshery resource or its
users. Tourism, and shrimp and salt farming in the costal shoreline
were all noted as causes of conﬂict with ﬁshers. During historical
trend analysis, ﬁshers reported that mangrove destruction had
increased many fold in recent decades due to shrimp and salt
farming, with the result that they were now more vulnerable to
natural disasters (cyclone, tidal waves etc.) as the natural buffer
created by mangroves had been destroyed. Furthermore, shrimp
and salt farming is also responsible for environmental changes in
coastal areas such as increasing salinity and soil degradation,
destruction of coastal vegetation and water logging, leading to
irreversible changes to micro-ﬂora and fauna and ﬁsh breeding
habitats, as well as loss of income for poor coastal households (CPD,
1998).
Conﬂict between ﬁsh processing and tourismwas reported in St.
Martin’s Island and Moheshkhali of Cox’s Bazar district. In these
areas ﬁsh drying is an important occupation for ﬁshers, who have
dried their ﬁsh close to beaches adjacent to ﬁsh landing sites for
centuries. However, in order to make beach more attractive to
tourists the authorities have imposed bans on drying ﬁsh near to
the shore. Fishers were not opposed to the expanding tourism in-
dustry as it also provides income and employment for them, but
they felt that government should make alternative arrangements
before taking restrictive decisions of this nature, such as allocating
other areas where they could dry ﬁsh.
4.1.5. Relationship between ﬁsheries and non-ﬁshery governance
issues
This type of conﬂict relates to issues of corruption, bribery, lack
of coordination and the over-lapping functions and jurisdictions of
government agencies. Conﬂicts of this type mainly occur due to a
lack of formal structures for ﬁsheries management and conﬂict
resolution, lack of transparency and poor governance. Issues
identiﬁed by ﬁshers during the study included encroachment of
areas used for net/boat drying by powerful individuals in connec-
tion with law enforcement agencies, theft of ﬁshing gear from
landing sites, pirate attacks at sea, illegal toll/tax collection by au-
thorities at landing sites, and corruption in the boat licensing
process. Fishers run into conﬂict with law enforcers, including
government ﬁshery ofﬁcers, whom they expect to protect their
interests as mandated by law. According to the stakeholders, many
local conﬂicts in ﬁsheries could have been easily resolved or would
not have arisen if there had been proper implementation and
enforcement of rules and regulations, and good coordinationbetween government agencies for the management of the re-
sources affected.
4.2. Conﬂict management in coastal ﬁsheries
The Actor-LinkageMatrix (ALM) analysis of conﬂicts in the study
sites found a lack of communication among stakeholders even in
the midst of brewing conﬂicts. In all the study sites, only ﬁsher-to-
ﬁsher communicationwas evaluated as generally effective, because
ﬁshers lived in the same community and could meet face-to-face to
discuss conﬂict issues. Formation of informal local level ﬁshers’
institutions by ECFC had positive impacts on communication be-
tween ﬁshers and also created the opportunity for them to bring
particular conﬂicts to the attention of government agencies. Most
stakeholder groups had negative perceptions of the effectiveness of
communication with government agencies and administrators.
Communication between groups of stakeholders and the mass
media were also generally rated as poor due to perceived bias in
disseminating information. Most stakeholders criticized the prev-
alence of top-down communication practiced by the government
or DOF. Meanwhile, researchers were evaluated as attempting to
communicate with other stakeholders but with limited effective-
ness due to lack of political proﬁle, personnel and resources.
Research outputs were also noted as having little inﬂuence on
policymakers and they were criticized as not being understood by
and explained to ﬁshers.
The synthesis of Communication Planning Strategies identiﬁed a
wide range of mostly participatory strategies for addressing ﬁsh-
eries conﬂicts. These often focused on reducing illegal ﬁshing,
reviewing ﬁsheries policies and rules to reduce sources of conﬂicts,
and building the capacity of ﬁshers and institutions for managing
conﬂicts. The cost associated with such strategies depends on the
means of communication employed. Group discussions, informal
meetings, direct contact or dialogues, and publicity through the
mass media are generally cheaper thanworkshops, leaﬂets, posters
and policy briefs. The most expensive communication channels
included a video show for awareness-creation, trainings on conﬂict
resolution methods and alternative income-generating activities,
and lobbying for policy change. The cost of such communication
strategies remains a constraint for poor coastal communities where
institutional support is needed. The next section discusses a
number of communication interventions applied in study sites
during the study period.
4.2.1. Workshops and meetings for ensuring multi-stakeholder
participation in conﬂict management
Meetings and workshops were found most effective among a
wide range of communication strategies because they remained
the best means to link communities, NGOs, government and
ﬁshers’ organizations in direct interaction to reach some level of
consensus on a particular dispute. As an example, ongoing conﬂict
between the boat owners and ﬁshers was common in all the study
sites. In order to address these disputes, workshops and meetings
were organized, at both the upazilla and district levels, to discuss
possible solutions. In almost all cases these resulted in a common
consensus between boat owners and ﬁshers associations to resolve
the issue by agreeing to prepare a written contract for recruitment,
labor payment and safety provision, instead of verbal contracts,
which were identiﬁed as the major reason for conﬂicts about
payment between the boat owners and ﬁshers.
In some cases it was also agreed to send boat owners’ repre-
sentatives on ﬁshing voyages to reduce misunderstandings
regarding illegal landings. In the absence of strict enforcement from
the government, both groups urged close supervision by their as-
sociations for proper implementation of the decisions. Due to these
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contracts for labor payment from boat owners for the 2006 ﬁshing
season, where none had been provided in 2005. However, although
this was a positive step towards resolving these conﬂicts, there was
concern among the ﬁshers involved over whether the majority of
boat owners who had agreed to this solution would honor it by
drawing up and abiding by contracts in the absence of a formal
system of governance to ensure that this was done.
4.2.2. Participatory Action Plan Development (PAPD)
Training of extension agency and NGO staff and community
leaders on the Participatory Action Plan Development (PAPD)
consensus building tool was found effective for developing com-
munity action plans for conﬂict resolution. The steps of PAPD
include: identifying the most likely potential conﬂicts in an area;
conﬂict solution analysis to assess the likely impact of actions
needed to achieve these solutions, and; forming consensus on so-
lutions (Sultana and Thompson, 2004; Barr and Dixon, 2001;
Holmes and Scoones, 2000). The PAPD method engages stake-
holders who have existing or potential conﬂicts with ﬁshers over
the use of common ﬁshery resources. This consensus building
approach helped to resolve some critical conﬂicts in the study area.
In Moheshkhali Upazilla, Cox’s Bazar district, for example, the
dispute between ﬁshers and local administration over ﬁsh drying
places was identiﬁed as the most severe conﬂict. In order to make
the place attractive to tourists, the local administration had banned
ﬁshers from processing or drying ﬁsh near the beach. This triggered
a spate of arguments between locals and the authorities as ﬁshers
derived much of their livelihoods from ﬁsh drying. Through the
PAPD exercise, ﬁshers and the local administration agreed that an
alternative spot would be allocated for ﬁsh drying activities. Fishers
and enforcement ofﬁcers who participated in the PAPD process
explicitly understood the importance of conﬂict resolution and
consensus building in the development of an action plan for
improving ﬁshers’ livelihoods and for sustaining the tourism
industry.
4.2.3. Multi stakeholder committee for conﬂict resolution
ECFC formed a Fishery Management Advisory Committee
(FMAC) at upazilla and district level to support the sustainable
conservation of ﬁshery resources. The committee was headed by
the local administrative chief, and all other extension agencies and
institutions involved in coastal ﬁshery management, including
ﬁshers’ representatives, were members. The committee was found
to be very effective inmanaging ﬁsheries conﬂicts through dialogue
and discussion with the conﬂicting parties. According to ﬁshers,
this forum helped them to quickly bring disputes to the notice of
the administration and other stakeholders.
FMAC had a good record of solving conﬂicts through informal or
formal discussions. For example, ﬁshers in Moheshkhali upazilla
had used a public place of about 6 ha for boat landing and net
drying for many years. Some powerful local people unexpectedly
and illegally encroached on a large portion of this land and estab-
lished settlements, then required ﬁshers to pay for any use of the
area and often harassed them physically. Fishers had previously
attempted unsuccessfully to bring this issue to the attention of the
upazilla level administration. However, after the issue was raised
with a wider circle of stakeholders during the FMAC meeting, staff
from the district level administration took immediate legal steps to
free the area for the ﬁshers.
4.2.4. Awareness raising in ﬁshing communities
Social mobilization of communities through different awareness
raising activities such as folk dramas, leaﬂeting, posters, rallies, and
miking was used to reduce illegal ﬁshing practices in coastal areas.These initiatives, which were supported by the Department of
Fisheries, allowed community members to raise their collective
voice against illegal gear operators. The study revealed many ex-
amples where community initiatives were successful in reducing
the use of illegal gears as well as conﬂicts. In study sites in Teknaf
upazilla destructive monoﬁlament gill nets worth approximately
$39 000 were voluntarily surrendered by the owners of illegal gear
due to persistent pressure from the ﬁshers and the local adminis-
tration (Dainik Cox’s Bazar, 2006). According to the ﬁshers, signif-
icant reductions in numbers of shrimp fry collectors also occurred
as a result of mass awareness raising activities and the self-
enforcement activities of ﬁshers and CBOs, with assistance from
community leaders.
4.2.5. Informal institutions as conﬂict mediators
Generally people in rural Bangladesh are reluctant to use the
formal legal system for conﬂict resolution due to the prohibitive
costs associated with litigation and police action. Instead, many
ﬁshers prefer to settle the issue through saleesh (informal village
level meetings). The transaction costs involved in using the
informal system are much lower than that of the formal system. In
most cases, ﬁshers bring cases ﬁrst to the head of the village or
Union Parishad (the lowest stratum of the local government) who,
along with a panel of elders, will summon the conﬂicting parties,
hear their arguments and concerns, and come to a decision on the
issue. Study participants noted thatminor conﬂicts such as disputes
between traditional gear users or conﬂict between ﬁshers, local
traders and money lenders are generally settled by saleesh. Ac-
cording to the ﬁshers we interviewed, one of the main advantages
of settling the disputes locally was that the powerful local in-
dividuals involved in deciding the outcome of the saleesh could
monitor and push for implementation of their decisions. However,
in many cases this results in unfavorable outcomes when the illegal
encroachers have good relations with the powerful.
ECFC attempted to improve the effectiveness of these local in-
stitutions by improving the skills of community leaders through
engagement in workshops and meetings. During the study it was
observed that these informal systems were also effective in dealing
with some severe conﬂicts. In one particular case near Kutubdia
Channel, locally inﬂuential individuals forcefully occupied grounds
which a number of ESBN operators had ﬁshed for many years.
When the ﬁshers brought this to the notice of the Union Parishad
chairman, he immediately called a saleesh where a decision was
taken to allow them back into their ﬁshing area.
4.2.6. Regional cooperation
Transboundary conﬂict is a major problem in coastal ﬁsheries,
causing much suffering for the ﬁshers involved. Although this type
of conﬂict is very difﬁcult to control, building better communica-
tion between Bangladeshi ofﬁcials and their counterparts in
neighboring India and Myanmar may help to minimize problems.
In order to foster cooperation, ECFC organized several exchange
visits between the neighboring countries. Fishing community
members and ECFC project staff shared their experience on ﬁshery
management issues with ofﬁcials from neighboring countries
during those visits. The better relationships that developed as a
result of these visits helped ﬁshers to resolve a number of disputes.
In one particular case, the Indian security force arrested 115
Bangladeshi ﬁshers from Kutubdia upazilla claiming that they had
entered Indian territory. The ﬁshers were sentenced to one and half
years in prison but, as a result of continuous dialogue between the
ofﬁcials of the two countries, were released after a month. The
ﬁshery ofﬁcials and the Fishers Association of West Bengal of India
played an important role in their release. There are no ofﬁcial sta-
tistics on howmany Bangladeshi ﬁshers are now in jail in India and
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time consuming process, but the example presented here indicates
that discussions at the national, local and Fishers Association levels
can help in resolving these problems. According to the stakeholders
involved, regional forums such as the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can also contribute in these types of
instances.
4.3. Fishers’ and conﬂict managers’ attitudes to conﬂict resolution
An attitude survey was conducted in the study area to capture
attitudinal changes that could be attributed to the communication
interventions. Table 1 shows some signiﬁcant changes in attitudes
among ﬁshers, although few such changes were found among
conﬂict managers. Jahan et al. (2009) also observed similar ﬁndings
in a study of the inland ﬁsheries of Bangladesh. They argued that
ﬁshers’ attitudes are formed through direct observation of the
causes and effects of conﬂict situations, meaning that they can
easily recognize changes resulting from the conﬂict resolutionTable 1
Attitude of ﬁshers and conﬂict manager before and after intervention.
Attitude statements Fishers
Before
Understanding of Conﬂicts
Inﬂux of new people into ﬁshing leads to severe conﬂicts
in ﬁsheries
1.73 (0.69)
Too many people chasing fewer ﬁsh is a major cause
of ﬁsheries conﬂicts
1.92 (0.99)
If government agencies did their job properly, there would
be very few conﬂicts ﬁsheries
1.18 (0.39)
Inﬂuence of powerful inﬂuentials in ﬁshing is the major
cause of ﬁsheries conﬂicts
2.05 (1.05)
Destructive ﬁshing practices are the reason
for ﬁsheries conﬂicts
1.52 (0.68)
Manageability of conﬂicts
Powerful groups will always be able to win conﬂicts
with less powerful ﬁshers
2.08 (1.08)
Local cooperation for conﬂict resolution will be effective
if government agencies participate
1.75 (0.66)
Communities can manage ﬁsheries conﬂicts themselves 1.97 (1.01)
Prerequisites for resolution
All parties need to understand existing policy
and regulations before a process of conﬂict
resolution can begin
1.34 (0.49)
Conﬂicts can be resolved if the community
is organized and works together with government
for resource management
1.40 (0.53)
Fisheries conﬂicts can be resolved if ﬁsheries rules
are strictly enforced
1.99 (0.64)
Better understanding of one another’s needs
will make it easier to resolve conﬂicts
1.26 (0.53)
Process of resolution
By strengthening the capacity of local institutions,
conﬂicts can be resolved
1.96 (0.77)
Conﬂicts can be resolved through dialogue
and negotiation
2.17 (1.13)
Conﬂicts between ﬁshers can be resolved
by bringing the parties together to discuss
1.95 (0.76)
Responsibility for resolution
Government is the only agency that
can manage conﬂicts
2.43 (1.42)
The NGOs can support communities
in managing conﬂicts
2.26 (1.40)
Fishers and their leaders should take the
initiative to resolve conﬂicts
2.04 (1.28)
Local elites can play an important role
in conﬂict resolution
1.55 (0.69)
Everyone has a social responsibility to help
to resolve conﬂicts
1.63 (0.73)
Note: Figures in the parentheses indicates the standard deviation; *Signiﬁcant at a ¼ 0.1process. In contrast, conﬂict managers are less likely to change their
attitudes in the short term as these are linked to their institutional
positions which reﬂect their own interests as powerful actors. This
means that they require more time to accept counter persuasion.
Table 1 shows that signiﬁcant attitudinal changes about the
management of ﬁsheries conﬂicts occurred among both ﬁshers and
conﬂict managers. As an example, in the ﬁnal survey both parties
expressed an increased consensus that greater cooperation be-
tween government and communities is required for better resource
management. This new understanding inspired them to undertake
joint awareness raising activities such as initiatives against illegal
gear operators. During group discussions, the majority of ﬁshers in
the study sites reported that use of destructive gears had been
signiﬁcantly reduced due to these initiatives.
Fishers were in strong agreement that conﬂicts can be resolved,
but that all parties need to understand existing policies and regu-
lations before the process of conﬂict resolution can begin. For
example, during group discussions it was found that many boat
owners were not aware of the law regarding safety requirements att-ratio Conﬂict managers t-ratio
After Before After
1.68 (0.64) 1.53 1.84 (0.97) 1.79 (1.15) 0.18
1.78 (0.79) 1.62 1.74 (0.76) 1.72 (0.67) 0.16
1.13 (0.33) 1.61 1.30 (0.46) 1.28 (0.45) 0.32
1.96 (0.97) 0.81 1.65 (0.61) 1.51 (0.74) 1.13
1.44 (0.59) 1.51 1.30 (0.46) 1.28 (0.45) 0.24
2.10 (0.99) 0.41 2.16 (1.23) 2.23 (1.41) - 0.46
1.66 (0.66) 2.18** 2.00 (1.13) 1.63 (1.00) 1.86*
2.02 (0.91) 0.97 3.28 (0.83) 3.16 (0.93) 1.06
1.02 (0.24) 7.34* 1.74 (1.03) 1.37 (0.49) 2.07**
1.28 (0.75) 1.73*** 1.40 (0.79) 1.21 (0.41) 1.75***
1.45 (0.65) 9.77* 1.81 (0.73) 1.72 (0.83) 1.15
1.05 (0.29) 6.52* 1.05 (0.21) 1.02 (0.15) 0.57
1.72 (0.86) 2.80* 1.86 (1.21) 1.79 (0.89) 0.55
1.60 (0.93) 6.96* 1.77 (1.02) 1.23 (0.65) 4.77*
1.80 (0.73) 3.141* 1.70 (0.71) 1.23 (0.43) 3.35*
2.47 (1.38) 1.34 1.93 (1.12) 1.91 (1.38) 0.14
2.12 (1.26) 2.50* 2.16 (1.38) 2.07 (1.47) 0.62
1.91 (1.23) 2.74* 1.93 (0.99) 1.77 (1.04) 1.47
1.41 (0.70) 1.79*** 1.70 (0.71) 1.51 (0.51) 1.39
1.38 (0.53) 3.52* 1.33 (0.47) 1.23 (0.43) 1.16
0; **Signiﬁcant at a ¼ 0.05; ***Signiﬁcant at a ¼ 0.01.
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from boat owners. Training on rules and regulations organized by
ECFC was a factor in motivating them to comply with these
regulations.
Both ﬁshers and conﬂict managers expressed the view that
dialogue and discussion between conﬂicting parties was necessary
to resolve conﬂicts. They felt the necessity of a multi-stakeholder
committee representing all the relevant stakeholders for facili-
tating discussion. The success of the FMAC in resolving conﬂicts in
the study area inﬂuenced them in reaching this conclusion.
Strengthening the capacity of ﬁshers’ organizations and strict
enforcement of regulations by conﬂict managers were both also
perceived to be helpful for ﬁsheries conﬂict resolution.
5. Conclusion and recommendations
The economic value of aquatic and coastal resources and liveli-
hood opportunities in the coastal waters of Bangladesh has attracted
a diversity of users. Conﬂicts arise as small-scale ﬁshers, who are
present in millions, interact with stakeholders including other
ﬁshers. This often includes the authorities, who fail to properly
enforce rules and regulations. The sector suffers further due to a lack
of inter-agency coordination among the various government in-
stitutions with jurisdiction over ﬁsheries. Such failures open up
opportunities for the violation of management rules and regulations,
and hence create conﬂicts in the sector. Even where lasting conﬂict
resolution may not be possible it is important to manage conﬂict so
that it can be channeled to constructive and collaborative solutions
instead of leading to violence or deepening poverty.
The study showed that many conﬂicts can be resolved through
appropriate communication strategies. A systematic communica-
tion and advocacy program with clearly deﬁned approaches and a
well-developed battery of information, education and communi-
cation materials can form the core of an intervention strategy to
improve stakeholder interactions and resolve conﬂicts. FishCom
was applied in the study area to resolve a number of such conﬂicts.
In most cases, actors involved arrived at a greater level of
consensus, indicating that more conﬂicts in ﬁsheries could be
resolved if FishComwere institutionalized through coastal resource
management plans. However, FishCom is not a panacea for
resolving all ﬁsheries conﬂicts. Moving further in this direction
would require harmonization of the functions and roles of a range
of institutional stakeholders in organizing and implementing co-
ordinated action plans for conﬂict resolution.
The study showed that government and community partner-
ships can support movement toward more effective ways of man-
aging conﬂicts and improve ﬁsheries management. Representation
and participation of users in the conﬂict resolution process and
involvement of ﬁshers in the implementation of decisions are
important factors in legitimizing a management system (Salayo
et al., 2008; Pomeroy et al., 2007). These lessons could enhance
opportunities for formulating policies and inﬂuencing policy ac-
tions for involving communities in the improved management of
conﬂicts over shared resources.
This study indicates that stakeholders recognized the value of
multi-stakeholder forums in ﬁsheries conﬂict management pro-
cesses. They believed that the collective efforts of ﬁshers, com-
munity members, and government and non-governmental
organizations involved in ﬁsheries management are required in
order to design effective conﬂict resolution systems. Inter-sectoral
analysis and dialogue undertaken by these stakeholders can facil-
itate better solutions to ﬁsheries conﬂicts. The study shows that
committees of this nature are able to represent a genuine interest in
ﬁsheries development, and can turn conﬂicts into opportunities for
facilitating more sustainable use of ﬁsheries resources.Acknowledgments
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